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Abstract By comparison with the prevention of terrorism, the prevention of acts of organized
crime might be thought easier to conceptualize precisely and less controversial to legislate
against and police. This impression is correct up to a point, because it is possible to arrive at
some general characteristics of organized crime, and because legislation against it is not
obviously bedeviled by the risk of violating civil or political rights, as in the case of terrorism.
But there is a significant residue of legal, moral and political difficulty: legislation against
organized crime is hard to make effective; the harm of organized crime is not uniform, and so
some preventive legislation seems too sweeping and potentially unjust. More fundamentally,
the scale and rewards of organized crime are often dependent on mass public participation in
markets for proscribed goods, which may point to a hidden public consensus in favour of some
of what is criminalized. For all of these reasons, I argue that existing preventive policing and
legislation against organized crime may be harder to justify than their counterparts in counter-
terrorism, at least in the UK.
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In liberal jurisdictions criminal justice is primarily backward-looking. For example, a murder
has been committed; the culprit is sought and (if all goes well) identified, arrested, fairly tried
and convicted, and then proportionately punished. Preventive justice is the criminalization of
steps that move an agent forward toward the commission of a serious crime. The steps may not
be particularly harmful in themselves: buying hydrogen peroxide or fertilizer, for example. But
individually harmless actions may enact a lethal plan, e.g. to build a bomb capable of killing
hundreds. Preventive legislation allows for arrests to be made and charges preferred when
there is evidence of (a) a plan to kill hundreds, (b) agreement among the planners on bombing
as the means, and (c) procurement by the planners of materials for bomb-making. The case for
criminalization in this sort of case is relatively strong, but critics of preventive justice point to
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other much more problematic offences, such as the glorification of terrorism, or acts of
radicalization, or 3rd party offences of non-disclosure of information about a plot.
By comparison with the prevention of terrorism, the prevention of acts of organized
crime might be thought easier to conceptualize precisely and less controversial to legislate
against and police. This impression is correct up to a point, because it is possible to
arrive at some general characteristics of organized crime, and because legislation against it
is not currently subject to heated public controversy based on probable violations of civil
or political rights, as in the case of terrorism. But there is a significant residue of legal,
moral and political difficulty: legislation against organized crime is hard to make effec-
tive; the harm of organized crime is not uniform, and so some preventive legislation
seems too sweeping and potentially unjust. More fundamentally, the scale and rewards of
organized crime are often dependent on mass public participation in markets for pro-
scribed goods, which may point to a hidden public consensus in favour of some of what
is criminalized. Preventive policing and legislation in both areas, then, are less easily
justified than first appears.
The rest of this paper is divided into five sections. I first identify some of the distinctive
characteristics of organized crime, which include the maintenance of illicit mass markets,
secrecy, ready resort to violence, and willingness to corrupt legitimate officials and politicians.
In Section 2 I connect the status of organized crime as serious crime with its tendency not only
to do harm to particular individuals, but also to undermine welfare-producing and politically
legitimate institutions. In Section 3 I turn to preventive measures, focusing on the Serious
Crime Preventive Order (SCPO) in recent legislation in force in England and Wales. I give
reasons for doubting the justice of SCPOs, and compare them unfavourably with preventive
measures geared to reducing the financial proceeds of crime. I then point out that these latter
measures, too, while justifiable, have not proven to be particularly effective. Section 4 goes to
the source of a deeper problem with preventive justice in the area of organized crime: namely
that there is mass public participation in some of the illicit markets that it depends upon. Does
mass public participation in these markets indicate a legitimating consensus in favour of their
legalization? Perhaps. But this does not rule out possible mass collusion in the victimization
and corruption associated with illicit markets. In order to provide support for decriminalization,
market participation needs to take the form of open civil disobedience. Sections 5 and 6 draw
conclusions about the distinctive problems of justifying preventive justice in the area of
organized crime.
1 What is organized crime?
The task of defining organized crime has not proved straightforward. In the US Presidential
Commission on Organized Crime in 1986, the difficulties were supposed to be contributed by
the term ‘organized’ rather than the term ‘crime’ (Washington Commission 1986: 25). But the
fact that some organized crime is often claimed to be victimless,1 or to involve illicit markets
that should arguably not be illicit, makes even the ‘crime’ in ‘organized crime’ problematic. At
the same time, the difficulties of capturing in law the kinds of organization that are
1 See Campbell (2013: 64) ‘Much organised crime does not involve a victim as such, and, as a result, the
gathering of evidence may prove problematic...’
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characteristic of organized crime have not gone away. I begin by trying to identify some
general, even if not defining, characteristics.
Organized crime typically consists of co-ordinated illegal activity for financial gain by a
group of agents over a significant period of time. The group of agents exhibits a division of
labour related to the component specialties involved in e.g. armed robberies or drug importa-
tion and dealing. Organized crime excludes more or less spontaneous, short-term looting
during a riot involving people who do not know each other, and it may even exclude a one-
off-coordinated criminal act (a bank robbery, say) carried out jointly by people who know each
other but who will never act together again. The central cases of organized crime addressed in
legislation and policy in Western jurisdictions involve more or less enduring crime gangs or
families from which criminal plans and acts emanate frequently. Each gang member knows at
least some of the other members well, and there are methods of recruitment tied to blood
relations or a territory, such as a neighbourhood, or a foreign country of origin.2 Of course, the
territorial associations of crime gangs do not prevent international operations, notably through
the internet, or transnational co-operation (Albanese and Reichel 2014).
Criminal gangs set out to make money by trading in illicit markets, or by robbery, fraud,
extortion, kidnapping and murder. These latter, overtly victimizing, forms of organized crime
are sometimes directed at ordinary citizens, and sometimes at rival criminals. Typically, the
membership and activities of gangs are kept a secret from everyone else, particularly the
authorities, and a great deal of ingenuity is directed by gangs at invisibly storing, transporting,
and reinvesting the financial proceeds of their primary activities. Violence –sometimes includ-
ing murder and torture– is used within gangs to maintain discipline, and against outsiders to
make money –through Bprotection^ schemes–or to discourage competition. As for their
dealings with the authorities, criminal gangs often try to bribe or blackmail police or judges
or politicians for information or influence (Gounev and Ruggiero 2012) and they hire the
services of non-criminals (e.g. legitimate lawyers, various kinds of craftsmen, doctors, scien-
tists, accountants) as and when their enterprises or plans require.
Awide variety of crime is engaged in by criminal gangs. The 2010 UK Government Threat
Assessment of Organised Crime (SOCA 2010) emphasizes drug importation and trading,
immigration crime in various forms, and a wide range of fraud. The shared purpose of all of
these forms of organized crime is money-making. Organized crime gangs seek to make
themselves rich, or perhaps to make themselves rich and consolidate their power and influ-
ence.3 What is more, getting rich and gaining power are not typically means to some further
organizing end. They are themselves organizing ends. Furthermore, since in many developed
jurisdictions convictions for organized crime are now associated with the confiscation of
criminal assets, gangs and families must not only find ways of making money but of keeping
it in the event that they are caught.
The fact that acquiring and keeping money and power are themselves organizing goals
helps to distinguish organized crime from co-ordinated criminal activities conducted to finance
terrorism. It is known, for example, that members of the Irish Republican Army carried out at
2 The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2001) Article 2 (a) defines an
organized criminal group as a group of three or more persons that was not randomly formed; existing for a
period of time; acting in concert with the aim of committing at least one crime punishable by at least 4 years’
incarceration; in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit. This definition is
unduly permissive, since it allows an ad hoc group formed to carry out a one-off criminal act as a kind of
organized crime.
3 Power is emphasised by the 1986 Presidential Commission Report (Washington Commission 1986: 29).
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least one huge bank robbery in December 2004 to support its paramilitary activities, and
specifically to finance purchases of weapons. More than £20 million in banknotes was taken in
an operation facilitated by the violent kidnapping of the family of a bank official (Guardian
2008). If the same amounts could readily have been raised from donations, then the rationale
for bank robberies or other conventional crime by the IRA might have seemed slight or non-
existent even from its own point of view.4 Again, if some hypothetical operation carried out by
the IRA had seemed potentially lucrative but involved targeting Northern Irish Catholics, i.e.
people from its core political and religious constituency, that, too would presumably have been
highly unattractive. For typical criminal gangs, on the other hand, there is no obvious upper
limit on the violence used or the targets of it, if there is £20 million to be made. The financial
rewards are always a strong consideration in their favour, even a conclusive consideration, if
the proceeds and the chances of escaping conviction are big enough.
Criminal gangs aim to maximize profits, and they do so primarily through fraud in
legitimate markets or selling goods in illicit markets. To give one example of fraud that is
familiar in the USA (Finckenauer 2005: 63-83 and esp. 77), the UK (Telegraph 2013) and
elsewhere (Barkhuizen 2014), insurance companies have received large numbers of claims on
staged automobile accidents, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/9937896/Police-
uncover-countrys-largestcash-for-crash-insurance-scam.html. Other examples of fraud involve
the sale over the telephone of worthless land or stock market securities to naïve or vulnerable
investors. Then there is cyber crime. Almost everyone who uses email has been on the
receiving end of the Nigerian 419 scam. That is, they have received unsolicited emails
proposing that, in return for a share, they receive into their bank account a transfer of
millions from a foreign jurisdiction.
The involvement of criminal gangs in fraud in legitimate markets is to be distinguished from
their activities in illicit markets. For our purposes, two kinds of illicit market can be distin-
guished, corresponding to what makes them illicit. Some markets are illicit in the sense that the
legislation of a legitimate government prohibits them. Not every such prohibition of a market is
uncontroversial, because the harm done by the goods traded is sometimes unclear, or clear but
apparently freely self-inflicted. The harm, if any, done by soft drugs is sometimes thought to be
of this type. The harm done by various kinds of alcoholic drink in the US during the Prohibition
era might provide a further example. Although marijuana and whisky are open to abuse by
buyers, legislation that prohibits trade in them can be thought to be unduly paternalistic, which
counts against their criminalization in liberal jurisdictions where they are outlawed.
The other kind of illicit market is where goods are legally or illegally sold but there are strong
moral reasons why they should never be. A market in forced labour is a relatively uncontro-
versial example. Another is a market in entertainment by fights to the death. An intermediate
case is where an illicit market in goods and services that are harmless to consumers starts to be
infiltrated by criminals with no scruples at all about what they sell. Markets in counterfeit goods
are an illustration, because they permit and even invite the sale of dangerous or even lethal
products. Cooking oil turns out to be contaminated; counterfeit vodka is discovered to be poison
(Guardian 2014); fake branded industrial goods blow up or catch fire; drugs with impurities or
in uncontrolled doses start to take lives (Lewis 2009). Since illicit markets have a built-in
predisposition to flout even basic trading standards if there is enough money to be made as a
4 This is not to say that terrorists and organized crime gangs cannot make common cause. Kirstin M. Finklea
takes this possibility seriously (Finklea 2010: 27-28).
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result, there is always a danger that merely prohibited markets will tip over into markets that are
morally impermissible because of the harmfulness of the goods or services sold.
Neither kind of ground for a market being illicit –legislative prohibition on the one hand or,
on the other, the exploitation or harm it involves –necessarily registers with criminal gangs as a
reason for not participating in that market. Admittedly, there may be financial reasons for
established criminal groups to abide by and perhaps even enforce basic trading standards if a
total disregard for these standards would undermine an illicit market. Drugs have to produce a
high to attract customers, but they must be safe enough not to make customers regularly ill. In
the same way, trafficked women may need to have access to adequate food and health care if
they are to attract customers in prostitution. Adequate nourishment and health care are in that
sense necessary background standards for the trade in sexual services. But, to labour the point,
it is only the possible loss of custom and profit –not the badness of harm or exploitation– that is
likely to weigh with criminal gangs in the enforcement of minimal standards. As far as
criminal gangs are concerned, there are no morally excluded markets or market practices,
except perhaps trading in inside information about the activities or plans of criminal groups.
Again, criminal gangs do not operate in illicit markets only. They try to invest the proceeds
of their illegal activities into legitimate markets and legitimate businesses. When this happens
they employ lawyers to make sure they miss no tax or trading advantages permitted to
legitimate businesses. At the same time, they are not above using illegal means, including
violence, to gain income from legitimate businesses they do not own or invest in. In local areas
they control, criminal gangs or families are often very willing simply to extort money from
legitimate businesses. In return for not using violence against the business owners or not
destroying their premises, criminal gangs regularly collect a portion of their receipts. Again,
typical criminal gangs are very willing to make corrupt payments for exemptions from
otherwise successfully enforced regulation or taxation. Through force and pay-offs they are
able to increase rewards and reduce costs in legitimate-seeming businesses in which they are
involved, that is, businesses that are conducted openly and with apparent regard for legality.5
2 Why is organized crime serious crime?
Organized crime is often treated in legislation as serious crime. The grounds for treating it this
way double as grounds for addressing serious crime with preventive justice measures. For it is
natural to think that the more serious the crime, the more its prevention is justified. And if the
prevention of a certain variety of serious crime is justified, then so might the criminalization of
steps characterisitically leading to its commission. Or at least, criminalization is in order—is in
order if—and this is a complex ‘if’—the steps are of a type that really do lead typically to a
serious crime, if the penalties associated with taking those steps reliably deter or disrupt
criminals, and if they are proportionately lower than the penalties for the fully realized serious
crime. These ifs define the work of this section and the next: we shall first give reasons why
organized crime should be regarded as serious crime, and then turn to the adequacy of selected
preventive justice measures.
In earlier work (Sorell 2016), I have complained of the inadequacy of accounts of serious
crime that take into account only directly victimizing offences (Von Hirsch and Jareborg
5 Legitimate businesses, admittedly, also resort to pay-offs at times. They are less likely to make direct threats of
violence to get their way, however.
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1991). These are offences in which one person suffers at the hands of another, and where
seriousness is a matter of the difference the offence makes to the victim’s standard of life. Murder,
which deprives someone of their life, is more serious than burglary, whichmight deprive someone
only of property that they are well able to do without or replace without hardship.
Although accounts along these lines make sense of the relative seriousness of a certain range of
offences –assault, homicide and burglary, for example –they do not capture what is wrong with
bribery, systemic fraud, misbehaviour in public office and other associated, commonly criminalized
activity. In earlier work I made it sufficient for reaching the threshold for serious crime that the
organized commission of a type of crime would undermine a welfare-enhancing or harm-reducing
institution, and the commission of that crime was organized and on an undermining scale. This is
the sort of account needed to explain the seriousness or large-scale organized benefit or passport
fraud, as well as standard forms of bribery and corruption. It is also the sort of account needed to
make sense of the seriousness of common forms of organized crime.
The hybrid account I favour, which makes both undermining welfare-producing institutions
and victimizing crime serious crime, is well adapted for explaining why common forms of
organized crime are serious. Part of the justification for the fight against organized crime, and
long sentences for common specimens of organized crime, must consist of (a) the reasons why
victimizing crime is wrong, since the violence and extortion characteristic or organized crime
are clearly victimizing. But that cannot be all. The justification must also include (b) reasons
why illicit markets are illicit even when market participants are not straightforwardly victims;
and (c) reasons why the corruption of officials is wrong. Let us start with (c).
Criminal gangs operate secretly over years outside the control of a people and its govern-
ment (Lynch and Phillips 1971: 59); operate for financial gain through violence, fraud and
participation in illicit markets; seek exclusive or monopolistic control of an illicit market;6 and
always stand ready to corrupt officials (Report to the Presidential Commission 1986: 25) That
is, they operate out of sight and in defiance of a jurisdiction and sometimes in competition with
the authorities in a jurisdiction. This is not because they recognize no authority; on the contrary,
they may be quite hierarchical themselves, or acknowledge a pecking order among fellow
underworld organizations. The point is that they are a locus of power and loyalty apart from
overworld institutions, with secret plans and organization, and with a sense of money-making
opportunities unconstrained by either conventional morality or law. They set themselves up as
regulatory powers within illicit markets, discouraging new market entrants, intimidating unruly
market participants, and acting violently against any would-be rival authorities. They do not
merely defy or ignore what the law prohibits, but recruit officials to see that the costs of defiance
and disregard for the law in their case are minimized or eliminated.
Organized crime, then, has both victimizing and institution-undermining aspects. Victim-
izing crime is wrong because of the harm—disablement, loss of life, infliction of pain, fear or
other kinds of distress of the person who is attacked or robbed or defrauded. Instead of harm,
one can speak in terms of a loss or diminution of standard of life. By contrast, corruption is
wrong because, among other things, it works directly against equal treatment before the law,
and equal treatment is a requirement of justice. More generally, corruption undermines legal
institutions, which have a certain priority in a system of welfare-raising and harm-reducing
6 BFrom all accounts, organized crime does not merely extend itself broadly, but brooks no competition. It seeks
not merely influence, but exclusive influence. In the overworld its counterpart would be not just organized
business, but monopoly. And we can apply to it some of the adjectives that are often associated with monopoly-
ruthless, unscrupulous, greedy, exploitative, unprincipled.^ (Schiller 1971: 73).
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institutions in developed states. For the police or judges or regulatory bodies to be bought is for
access to justice and other forms of welfare to be restricted, or for its distribution to be arbitrary
or discriminatory if corrupting agents apply the appropriate influence.
What about (b)? Illicit markets are illicit typically because (i) the products they offer are
often harmful; and (ii) sellers in the market know that they are harmful, and consumers don’t
know, or are under some sort of compulsion to buy even if they do know about the harmful
effects. In such cases illicit markets are illicit because they are victimizing. But this is not all.
Illicit markets often operate with the collusion of officials, who are paid to turn a blind eye to
the victimization. In these cases, the prosecution of illicit market activity is partly justified by
what is wrong with victimization and party justified by what is wrong with corruption.
3 Preventive legislation in the UK
I have been trying to enlarge on the basis for criminalizing behaviour leading to organized
crime: the basis includes the badness of direct, victimizing harm and the badness of
undermining socially beneficial institutions by corruption. I now turn to legislation and policy,
including preventive legislation and policy, devised to combat organized crime. To make the
discussion manageable, I concentrate on the UK.
With the exception of legislation against the intimidation of jurors and witnesses,7 and
the corruption of police, prison and probation officers,8 which acknowledges the steps
sometimes taken by organized crime to pre-empt or undermine prosecutions, UK legislation
does not dwell on the efforts by organized crime to undermine the justice system or to
influence politicians. Instead, it seems to focus on three things: (i) the identification and
prosecution of money laundering (Money Laundering Regulations 2007); (ii) confiscating
the financial proceeds of crime (Proceeds of Crime Act 2002); and (iii) preventing the
resumption by convicted gang members of roles in criminal gangs after they are released
(Serious Crime Act 2007).
Although (i) and (ii) are sometimes criticized for irresponsibly and stingily outsourcing
judicial or police oversight and investigatory functions to banks (Campbell 2013: 71) I shall
concentrate on (iii). This form of UK legislative response to organized crime differs from (i)
and (ii) in significantly limiting the liberty of ex offenders. It is associated with the Serious
Crime Prevention Order (SCPO) introduced by the Serious Crime Act (2007). Schedule I of
this Act recognizes all of the following as serious crimes: drug trafficking; people trafficking;
arms trafficking; prostitution and child sex; armed robbery; money laundering; fraud; tax
evasion; corruption and bribery; counterfeiting; blackmail; intellectual property offences;
environmental offences, including large-scale fishing by prohibited methods, and water
pollution. Many of these are directly victimizing. Counterfeiting, intellectual property offences
and some environmental crimes (though perhaps not all in Schedule 1) are different. They
undermine welfare-producing institutions, or agreements.
7 See (Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994), esp. s. 51.
8 The UK Anti-Corruption Plan (HM Government 2014) provides for a new offence of police corruption (p. 11),
and discusses new powers to target corruption in prisons and post-conviction processes. There is also acknowl-
edgment of corruption in government procurement processes. The UK Independent Police Complaints Com-
mission, in its second report on police corruption, which covers the period 2008-2011, (IPCC 2012) reports
relatively few upheld complaints about corruption in the form of perverting the course of justice, but reports
surveys suggesting that corruption, is perceived by the public to be widespread.
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The SCPO is one of a very wide range of preventive orders now available to the UK
authorities to counteract everything from anti-social behaviour to terrorist activity, broadly
construed. Preventive orders in general have been criticized in the academic legal literature for
unduly limiting the liberty of people (Ashworth et al. 2013), and the question now briefly to be
considered is whether this general form of criticism applies to the SCPO (Sorell 2016).
The SCPO enables courts to restrict the activities of those who have been convicted of
Schedule 1 offences after they have served their sentences, so as to make it difficult for them to
resume their place in a gang or in a network of criminal specialists that career criminals can call
upon from time to time. Sections 5 and 6 (3) illustrates ways that SCPOs limit the freedom of
ex-offenders:
Examples of prohibitions, restrictions or requirements that may be imposed on individuals
(including partners in a partnership) by serious crime prevention orders include prohibitions or
restrictions on, or requirements in relation to—
(a) an individual’s financial, property or business dealings or holdings;
(b) an individual’s working arrangements;
(c) the means by which an individual communicates or associates with others, or the persons
with whom he communicates or associates;
(d) the premises to which an individual has access;
(e) the use of any premises or item by an individual;
(f) an individual’s travel (whether within the United Kingdom, between the United Kingdom
and other places or otherwise).
These are very broad areas of potential interference, and they seem to impose a penal
burden on an offender even after a conviction is spent. Serious crime prevention orders
can last for 5 years. This is a long time. Instead of returning to society with a clean slate,
those who are released from prison after having been convicted of a serious crime are
liable to suffer a considerable loss of autonomy over a significant period, with conditions
of life significantly determined by judicial decision. Since the threshold for serious crime
can be met by someone guilty of no more than online piracy of videos or music, the risk
of injustice seems substantial.
To show the SCPO in a more favourable light, it may be necessary to distinguish
between one-off and repeat offenders, and, within the category of repeat-offenders,
between those who have operated solo, and those who belong to or who regularly co-
operate with crime gangs. For obvious reasons, one-off offenders are less credible targets
for SCPOs than repeat offenders. As for repeat offenders, the loss of autonomy associated
with an SCPO may make sense where there is good evidence that an ex-convict has been
involved in organized crime and is likely voluntarily to return to it. Often convicts who
have worked with a criminal gang once may face expectations backed by coercion of
future co-operation. Convicts leaving prison might face hard-to-refuse demands of collab-
oration from criminal gangs and might actually be helped not to collaborate by serious
crime prevention orders.
Let us agree with the critics of preventive orders that the SCPO is a questionable measure
when directed at ex-offenders who are not members of criminal gangs: are we being too quick
to concede that it is appropriate for people who have taken part in organized crime? After all,
Schedule 1 recognizes a very wide range of organized crime. Do all forms deserve the same
treatment? Surely fishing by prohibited methods and intellectual property offences, when
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carried out by criminal gangs, are not as serious –in the sense of being directly victimizing and
inflicting serious harm–as people-trafficking and organized sexual assault of children? Surely
the less serious Schedule 1 offences may produce less harm and so justify less well the far-
reaching restrictions on liberty which SCPOs may involve?
Here some of the empirical research commissioned by the Home Office in the UK may be
relevant. AHomeOffice Research Report (Francis et al. 2013) on career criminals and organized
crime notes that offenders involved in organized crime, while predominantly involved in drug
dealing and importation, are not specialists, and that the time they spend in prison deepens and
broadens their criminal connections and their knowledge of methods of committing other
offences. Nearly a third of all those involved in organized crime covered by the study belonged
to the category Bversatile and very prolific^ –far more than in the other categories included:
Bmainly violence^, Bmixed prolific^, Bmainly acquisitive^ and Bmainly drugs^. Indeed, the
Bversatile and very prolific^ category of organized criminal was twice as large as the next largest
Bmainly violence^ category. Belonging to the Bversatile and very prolific^ category made it
almost certain that in the 5 years leading to arrest for an organized crime offence –an offence with
a given term of imprisonment for which someone was co-convicted—the offender had commit-
ted some other offence or other, including a .7 probability of having committed violence against a
person or a theft and handling stolen goods offence, and a .95 probability of having breached a
court order or bail (Francis et al. 2013: 50).9 The research also revealed a pattern of increasing
seriousness for crimes committed over a career starting in the early teens, with the most serious
crimes being committed at around the age of 40.10
This research on the career trajectory of people involved in organized crime may help to
justify measures that disrupt patterns of association between early career criminals and senior
career criminals both during and after imprisonment. This can include disruptions of patterns
of association by means of SCPOs. There is also empirical evidence for distinguishing
between offences likely to be committed by organized crime, and offences that can be.
Offences likely to be committed by organized crime include forgery and counterfeiting,
firearms and drugs offences (Ackerley et al. 2002: Appendix A). All of these are Schedule 1
offences. So if there is evidence that an early career organized criminal is going to associate
after imprisonment with known counterfeiters and arms traffickers, that might also be a reason,
though admittedly not a decisive reason, for issuing an SCPO banning those associations so as
to prevent a career in organized crime.
Although the appropriateness of SCPOs for veterans of very harmful organized crime is at
least arguable, we do not have before us a conclusive case in its favour. On the contrary, we
have some reasons for thinking that the target group for the imposition of SCPOs is too
undifferentiated in the Serious Crime Act (2007). This raises the question of whether other
preventive measures against organized crime, measures that at first seem to limit liberty less
than SCPOs, might be preferable. For example, might anti-money laundering measures, and
powers of confiscating the proceeds of crime be morally superior to the imposition of SCPOs?
9 Related Home Office research appears to indicate that convictions for some violent offences is weakly
predictive of murder and serious sexual assault. See (Ackerley et al. 2002).
10 Since seniority in a criminal gang comes with the authority to delegate crime to others and so escape arrest and
imprisonment oneself, involvement by senior gang members in serious crime is largely missed by the report we
are considering. But the existence of crime leaders with authority to delegate crime does help to explain why, at
40, convictions of career criminals decline: some of those criminals have become important enough to direct
rather than participate in operations, and to get more junior people involved in the sort of crime that made them
eligible for leadership.
Organized Crime and Preventive Justice 145
Here, too, the answer may be less clear-cut than at first appears. According to an estimate in
a 2005 report (Corporation of London 2005), annual proceeds of crime in the UK amount to
between £19 and £48bn and only £80 m is confiscated. In the US the corresponding best guess
is $110bn, of which £340 m is confiscated (Corporation of London 2005: 16). If these figures
are even roughly correct, the effectiveness of measures that are supposed to counteract crime
by making it harder for criminals to enjoy the proceeds is low. Since reducing bad effects is
part of the moral case for anti-money-laundering measures, the ineffectiveness of those
measures matters morally and counts against those measures. The same conclusion seems to
be supported by the relatively low number of prosecutions brought by the UK authorities
relative to the volume of suspicious activity reports from financial institutions, the relatively
small number of banks fined for money-laundering, and the relatively small fines levied up to
2008 when any were levied at all (Harvey 2008).11
Again, and perhaps surprisingly, the criminalization of money laundering has come in for
criticism on moral grounds. In the US, money laundering can attract a 10-year prison sentence:
Douglas Husak objects to this sort of penalty (Husak 2008: 41). According to him, depositing
the proceeds of crime X does not add to the wrong of X itself, and only acts that reach the
threshold for moral wrongness should be dealt with by hard treatment like imprisonment.
Husak would not reject non-penal treatment for money-launderers, say taxing them or making
it administratively difficult for them to deposit the proceeds of crime.12 His point is that
imprisonment is out of order because punishment is out of order for something –an act of
depositing money– that is neither wrong in itself, nor necessarily bad in its effects. His target is
US statutes that would punish a criminal for e.g. investing the proceeds of crime into a college
fund for his nephew. More generally, his target is the punishment by imprisonment of a very
large range of offences that are merely legally prohibited rather than wrong in themselves. He
thinks that unbridled criminalization is behind the disproportionately large size of US prison
populations, and also the huge and, in his opinion, misdirected investment in the enforcement
of US drug legislation (Husak and de Marneffe 2005).
I disagree with Husak’s claim that money-laundering should not be criminalized. Organized
crime is a money-making enterprise. To turn its proceeds into money that can safely be kept,
criminals need methods of investing it undetected in legitimate businesses. Money-laundering
also facilitates the personal enjoyment of the proceeds of organized crime by criminals, and
also helps to finance political influence and legislation favourable to industries, such as
casinos, hotels and entertainment in which the proceeds of crime have sometimes been
invested. Knowingly making it easier through money-laundering for a criminal gang with a
long track record of brutality to extend that record, or to diversify their activities to include
further offences that are mala in se, does seem, in its turn, wrong in itself, and therefore
punishable in principle. Money laundering typically finances not only more serious harm –an
increase in the number of crimes of a given degree of harmfulness– but an apparatus designed
to make harm-production efficient in the future. An apparatus that, so to speak, industrializes
crime –that makes the organization of crime more systematic and more efficient– is worse than
arrangements that simply facilitate more crime. The former involves specialization and co-
ordination of many people’s efforts. This is different from, and morally worse than, using the
proceeds of one’s own crimes to move from a part-time to a full time solo career in burglary.
11 Fines have increased and have been imposed more frequently in the last 10 years.
12 It is unclear whether Husak would regard a court-ordered confiscation of the proceeds of crime a kind of penal
treatment.
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Admittedly, if a criminal gang had a plan, as in one of the Godfather film trilogy, of getting
out of organized crime altogether by means of money-laundering in the short-term, the moral
case for punishing its money-laundering would have to proceed along different lines from the
argument for criminalizing measures that industrialize crime. As things typically are, however,
the laundered proceeds of crime stand ready to be used by people whose activities straddle the
worlds of crime and legitimate business, and who want that straddling to continue. Despite the
moral and political exceptionalism of their participation in illicit markets, criminal gangs assert
their rights aggressively when they have stakes in legitimate businesses and legitimate
markets. Laundered assets – assets that are easier to keep because they look legitimate and
are protected by law –are more attractive for criminal and legitimate business activities alike
than easy-to-pilfer and incriminating piles of cash in a back room. However, and again as
things typically are, there is nothing to make criminals prefer legitimate to criminal activities if
the returns of the latter are much greater and the costs or risks are comparable. There is
nothing, therefore, to stop laundered assets from financing far more crime than legitimate
business when the assets can in principle be ploughed into either. Since criminals typically
make deposits, or have deposits made, with a view to financing more crime and an improved
crime apparatus, the criminalization of money laundering seems to be perfectly in order.13
It may be true that otherwise innocent third parties hired to handle money for laundering are
unjustly prosecuted for money-laundering and are only the unwitting associates of criminals. It
may be true that it is hard for these third parties to know for certain whether money that they
are handling is criminal or not. It may further be true that trying to find out the source of
deposits and trying to identify suspicious transactions unfairly imposes financial costs on
financial institutions and unfairly transfers legal liabilities to them. It may, finally, be true that
when pressed into quasi-forensic roles, employees of financial institutions have discretion to
inconvenience and even victimize non-criminal clients that law enforcement officials would
not have. In all of these ways, the outsourcing of anti-laundering measures by governments
may involve injustice to third parties. These considerations, however, do not count against the
criminalization of money-laundering: they are reasons for not delegating responsibility for
detecting money-laundering to financial institutions. Perhaps public bodies need to carry out
these checks, albeit with money raised from the financial sector.
4 Public participation in illicit markets
In the last section I considered some drawbacks of preventive justice measures for organized
crime. These seemed either disproportionate, as in the case of SCPOs, or hard to make
effective. But there are deeper reasons for thinking twice about organized crime, and these
are to do with the way that mass public participation in illicit markets arguably pushes them in
the direction of legitimacy.
The main illicit market in the UK is in drugs,14 and the drug trade owes its profitability to
widespread participation in it by the public. I concede that some participation is grounded in
addiction, so that it is not all out Bwilling^ participation. What about the non-addicted?
Admittedly, these market participants are not coerced. Still, members of the public who
apparently willingly buy services from organized crime have to enter an economic zone that
13 For different arguments to the same conclusion, see Young (2009). Young partly relies on (Alldridge 2001).
14 Comprehensively described in (Home Office 2007).
Organized Crime and Preventive Justice 147
exists in defiance of a jurisdiction that they are otherwise mostly obedient to. This means that
even the Bwilling^ participation of people as consumers in illicit markets is conflicted. It
requires people to compartmentalize their underworld and overworld activities by keeping e.g.
their drug purchases secret from the authorities and other people. Again, the underworld
activity of customers in illicit markets seems to defy legislative and other institutions that in
their overworld civic roles of voter and juror those people genuinely support. So participation
in an illegal market fragments the civic personas of market participants. This makes it quite
different from consumer activity in legal markets.
Nevertheless, the fact that people at the receiving end of illicit markets run by crime gangs
do not seem to be victimized—coerced or harmed against their will—and that there is durable
demand for illicit goods and services, makes some non-fraudulent organized crime resemble
mainstream business activity. The resemblance sometimes prompts public discussion of the
possible legalization of the markets in question. Gambling is one of the formerly illegal
activities that has passed into the mainstream of many jurisdictions. The sale of sex and drugs,
though legal in some places, is more of a rarity.
Does the fact that there is apparently great public demand for illegal drugs throw doubt on
the legitimacy and authority of laws that make the possession, purchase, importation and
distribution of drugs illegal? The fact there is a strong analogy between some drugs and some
legally sold kinds of alcohol certainly adds to scepticism about the blanket criminalization of
drugs. And since only the prevention of serious crime justifies liberty-limiting preventive
measures, is it reasonable for preventive orders to be issued to veteran drug dealers or drug
runners involved only with recreational drugs?
Perhaps the less victimizing the crime and the less harm is done, as in dealing soft drugs as
opposed to heroin, the less criminalization in the first place is justified. In the case of small-
scale consumers of illegal soft drugs who otherwise do not commit offences, criminalization of
possession may be particularly hard to justify. Although the criminalization of possession may
be regarded as a preventive measure in that it is meant to discourage transactions in the drug
market in general, including the sector involved with the sale of hard drugs, the harm caused
by mere possession of any drug, even hard drugs, is surely negligible or non-existent, and the
effect on organized crime of confiscating small quantities of soft drugs or of discouraging the
smallest players in the market is surely slight. Discouraging drug production, or confiscating
big shipments of very harmful because addictive drugs at the point of importation, is surely
much more justifiable.
Although these considerations have some force, they do not show that mass participation in
drug markets should simply be tolerated by the authorities, or that ordinary consumers of small
quantities of non-addictive drugs do nothing wrong by buying regularly from drug dealers. Just
because they are otherwise law-abiding, the small-scale consumers we are considering are guilty
of exceptionalism. That is, they have pretensions to be their own judges of which laws they will
abide by and which they will break. It is true that they are not exceptionalists of the same order as
those who direct organized crime, since the latter group are willing to commit violent offences
and fraud on a large scale if the profits are high enough and if there is a good chance that they will
not be caught. Organized criminals are willing, in other words, to break a whole range of laws,
and indeed to direct and even coerce others to do so. Otherwise law-abiding small-scale
consumers of drugs are probably much better morally as individuals, and would probably be
horrified by the willingness of organized crime to make money from causing harm.
This does not mean that consumers of soft drugs deserve no moral criticism. After all, their
purchases foreseeably add to the profit that keeps organized crime in any market, including
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markets that should always be illicit. Again, the market for soft drugs need not be, and is often
intended by criminals not to be, cut off from the market for more profitable and addictive
drugs. Although some of the illicit drugs sold in the general drug market are probably
harmless, many others are not. Being a consumer in a relatively harmless section of an illicit
market can expose oneself and others to the promotion of much more harmful drugs. Finally,
there are no reliable mechanisms of quality control in an illicit market to ensure that the even
the supply of normally harmless drugs does not get contaminated. This fact is a reason why
participation in an illicit market for even soft drugs can never be reliably informed, and why,
consequently, market participants run a greater risk of harm than consumers in other markets.
Or to put it another way, consumers of even the normally harmless drugs in an illicit market
can very easily be victimized, and it is a kind of good luck if they are not victimized.
There are also considerations about violence. Illicit markets in drugs are regulated by a lot
of threatened and actual victimizing violence, some of it life-threatening, mainly inflicted by
members of criminal gangs on one another and on customers and dealers who default on
payments (Home Office 2007). This means that even if illegal drug purchases are typically
uncoerced and do not lead to debilitating addiction, they take place within a market that relies
heavily and conspicuously on victimizing violence. Knowledge of that violence is not esoteric:
punishments for theft or default are often well advertised to all market participants. Acting as a
dealer in the drug market signals a tolerance of that violence. Acting as a regular purchaser can
also signal tolerance. What is more, acting as a purchaser can help to fund the purchase of de
facto impunity from police investigation and prosecution through bribery. Taking part in the
drug market may also contribute indirectly to the recruitment of young people to crime instead
of education, and to imbalances in the allocation of policing and other resources in response.15
The idea that purchases of soft drugs are normally innocent, then, is doubtful.
Things would stand differently morally if the typical purchase of soft drugs were open
and intended as part of a public campaign directed at legalizing drugs. This would elevate
drug purchases from acts of self-indulgent exceptionalism to acts of drug consumption
seeking legitimization through the political process. But as things actually are, drug
purchases by the otherwise law-abiding are carried out quietly and evasively, out of the
sight of the same police department that drug purchasers would call in if their houses
were burgled or their cars stolen. Perhaps the elimination of this inconsistency or
hypocrisy would add to the case for drug legalization. But its existence in the interim
certainly counts against citizen participation in drug markets. It does not matter whether
the citizen participation is on a large scale or not: the only way to legitimize it is through
legislative change, or, short of that, a public campaign of law reform including civil
disobedience combined with willingness to submit to arrest for it.
5 Prevention of organized crime vs counter-terrorism
It is time to return to the contrast between the fight against organized crime and counter-
terrorism. Each is supported by legislation and policy that are eminently criticisable, but
criticisable in very different ways. In the case of organized crime, as we have seen, the deepest
15 The argument for treating participation in a violent, illegal market as serious crime may also be an argument
for policy that will remove the violence, e.g. by creating a legal and regulated drug market. Discussion of this
issue is outside the scope of the present paper.
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problems arise from the fact that market activity is at its heart, and that there is large-scale
public participation in some of it, sometimes with little resulting harm. Among illicit markets
the most problematic are those in which the commodities whose use is criminalized are hardest
to distinguish from the commodities traded in legal markets. This is arguably how things stand
with the illicit market in soft drugs for recreational purposes, comparable as it is to the entirely
legal market in cigarettes and alcohol. It has already been strongly suggested that the right
response to the criminalization of participation in questionably illicit markets is political: a
consensus can legally be built in favour of law reform by market participants, and in that way
some illicit markets can properly be brought out from prohibition.
When it comes to counter-terrorist legislation the deepest problems are quite different. They
are not to do with money-making, markets or by the role of big sections of the general public
in buying illicit goods. They arise instead from the perceived need to curtail the rights of
ideological minorities as a means of preventing violence or attacks by a tiny number within the
ideological minority. In the UK, terrorism legislation directly restricts the freedom of associ-
ation and the freedom of expression, respectively, in as much as membership in certain
violence-supporting organizations is outlawed (Terrorism Act 2000), and in as much as the
expression of support for acts of terrorism, even in the past, is also an offence. The reason the
restriction of the rights of ideological minorities is a deep problem, as opposed to a problem
simply, is that it seems to relax protections that are constitutive of liberal politics. On the other
hand, when the freedom of association and freedom of expression are used to gather and make
vocal support for violent political change, those freedoms are arguably being perverted
themselves. We might say that both the non-violent support for terrorism and the counterter-
rorism measures that it inspires denature the liberal democratic context that make them
possible. There is no counterpart of this in the fight against organized crime.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, preventive justice is radically different in the two cases, and,
when questionable, questionable for different reasons. Preventive measures against organized
crime in the UK are aimed at reducing its financial rewards and discouraging or disrupting
career criminality. Consumer participation in criminally organized illicit markets, especially for
soft drugs, is treated with a light touch. Depending on the reasons for it, the light touch might
be justified. It might be justified if soft drugs used for recreational purposes are relatively
harmless. It might be justified if, in addition to being harmless, soft drugs are the subject of
broadly based campaigns for legalization and policing of small scale consumption becomes
unaggressive to reflect this.
Preventive measures in counter-terrorism have a very different character. Apart from
criminalizing the Bglorification^ of terrorism in broadcasts and print (Terrorism Act 2006:
s1), and proscribing Islamist organizations, successive UK governments have introduced many
third party offences, including various failures to tell the authorities about the preparation of
terrorism. In addition to non-disclosure offences, there has been a devolution of responsibility
to non-governmental institutions to monitor local processes of radicalization. For example,
universities and prisons have duties under the Prevent strand of UK counter-terrorism policy.
These duties are spelt out in the Counter Terrorism and Security Act (2015: s29).16
It might be thought that these third-party obligations are the counterparts of anti-money
laundering monitoring in financial institutions. But this is a mistake, because some of the new
16 See also the Prevent Duty Guidance in England and Wales (HM Government 2015: para 114)
BUniversities will be expected to carry out a risk assessment for their institution which assesses where and how
their students might be at risk of being drawn into terrorism.
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obligations have the effect of clashing with some of the functions of the institutions on which
they are imposed. Universities, for example, are among the custodians and channels for the
freedom of expression and, up to a point, the freedom of association. Moreover, they are home
to experiments in free expression. Students at universities have often tried out different kinds of
protest tactics, including violent ones. Student newspapers and debating societies have often
expanded the limits of free expression and have introduced more variety into the range of
discussable political views. The university environment, in short, is a particularly protected
space for the exercise of freedoms of expression and thought. Since the line between avant-
garde debate and radicalization is sometimes too fine to be discerned, debate is likely
increasingly to be suppressed in the name of preventing radicalization. In this way, the new
duty under Prevent policy may only help to denature the institutions in the university sector
that assume it.
Even non-violent extremism is targeted by the Prevent Duty Guidance for England and
WalesMarch 2015 (HM Government 2015: para 8). Non-violent extremism includes agitation
against BBritish values,^ such as tolerance and democracy. In short, the reinterpretation of
terrorism to include much more than violence against civilians to force a change of policy by
government introduces a much wider range of possible precursor offences and preventive
policing operations. No-one can reasonably object to precursor offences consisting of ordering
the ingredients of a bomb or of recruiting personnel for a bomb attack. But recently introduced
offences have quite a different character. They call upon institutions to root out practices that
are hard to distinguish from things those institutions have tolerated for a long time. What is
more, the new duties are being imposed without its being clear that they will be effective in
reducing the volume of extremism, violent or non-violent. This fact, together with the strong
possibility that non-violent extremism is offensive rather than harmful, suggests that criminal-
ization in counter-terrorism has already gone too far.17 The case for a comparable conclusion
with regard to organized crime is much weaker.
6 Conclusion
Preventive justice is not only controversial in counter-terrorism: it is disputable even in the area
of organized crime. One reason is that preventive measures in the form of confiscation of
assets have not been very effective. But there are also principled objections, based on the
connection of organized crime to questionably illicit markets. Some illicit markets trade in
products that are arguably no more harmful than certain lawfully traded goods. The compa-
rability of some licit and illicit markets in this respect; and the fact that certain illicit markets
are widely patronized despite their being unlawful, provide reasons for legalization when
combined with anti-paternalistic arguments. These considerations do not show, however, that
all kinds of public participation in questionably illicit markets is legitimate. Participation
becomes legitimate when linked publicly to a campaign of law reform. Leaving aside
controversially outlawed markets, there is plenty to justify the prevention of organized crime.
There is the severe harm it produces, the commodification of this harm, the illegitimate power
17 The Behavioural Sciences Unit of MI5 (the UK security service addressing domestic threats) distinguishes
between Btalkers^ (whose extremism is registered in speech and writing only) and Bwalkers^, who are willing to
kill or injure others. This is an important distinction in the justification of preparatory offences: criminalization
needs to fasten on the Bwalkers^.
Organized Crime and Preventive Justice 151
structures it sustains, and the threat it poses through bribery and coercion to legitimate power
structures and the non-criminals they protect. There is also the evidence, at least in the UK, that
serious crime occupies people as a career, and that over time criminals diversify their criminal
activities. Although Serious Crime Prevention Orders may address these facts in a clumsy way,
this does not mean that they are entirely unjustified. In the case of terrorism, on the other hand,
preventive justice is controversial because of its multiplication of preparatory offences, its
multiplication of 3rd party legal liabilities, and its prohibition of relatively harmless practices
that are often innocent exercises of human rights.
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